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Six Scenarios for End of the Ukrainian Conflict

16 Apr, 2022, No comments

On the 24th of February Russia started illegal aggression on Ukraine calling it the "Special Military Operation". As the war is ongoing for almost two months, the Ukrainian army has shown an unexpectedly good resistance after the initial penetration of the Russian army. However, the war is far from over, unfortunately. Therefore, both sides still have a lot to do if they want to win the war. The aim of this article is to present six different scenarios in terms of a territorial split depending on how decisively one or the other side won. 
1. Decisive Russsian victory


This scenario implies that Ukraine is militarily defeated, its army capitulates and it is forced in signing a very unfavourable peace treaty. In this case, the territory that once belonged to Ukraine would be split in half, with eastern territories becoming independent states or annexed by Russia. The western part would remain (formally) independent with the potential puppet government controlled by Moscow and used as a buffer zone against NATO. The territorial s plit is shown in picture 1.   

2. Russian victory

In the second scenario, Russia wins without being able to completely destroy the Ukrainian army and force it to capitulate. Instead, war is over at the negotiating table with Russia taking all Black Sea regions effectively land

locking Ukraine. By the agreement Ukraine agrees to military neutrality with the option to join the EU, in return, it recognizes the loss of territory. 



 
3. Pyrrhic Russian victory 


Russia wins the war, but with heavy losses without being able to effectively control the whole of eastern Ukraine and the Black Sea regions. Instead, it keeps the control of what is called Novorossiya, keeping a land connection between Crimea and the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics. This outcome becomes increasingly realistic, having in mind that the Russian offensive has stopped and in some parts its army has retreated. 


4. Pyrrhic Ukrainian victory 


Ukrainian army succeeds in defending from the aggression and liberating some of the previously occupied Oblasts, however, at a high price. It loses a lot of civilians, soldiers, armaments, airplanes and other military equipment. Crimea and LPR and DNR are annexed by Russia and Ukraine is forced to recognize the loss by signing a peace agreement. This outcome is as well highly possible.

5. Ukrainian victory 


Ukraine manages with the support of Western allies (support in sending military aid, not direct involvement in the conflict), to liberate all territories that it controlled before the start of the aggression. Donetsk and Lugansk remain under the control of rebels but are not internationally recognizes nor does Russia tried to annex them. Russia admits the defeat and preserves control over Crimea only. 

6. Decisive Ukrainian victory

Ukraine is coming out of the war victorious while Russia experiences embarrassing defeat being forced to leave Crimea as well. Ukraine then joins NATO and the EU, while Russia is not considered as a world superpower anymore.  


Double Effect Doctrine in the Case of NATO Aggression on FR Yugoslavia in 1999

22 Nov, 2020, No comments


Photo: Anti-Aircraft Missiles Over Belgrade

War and all other armed conflicts in most cases inevitably mean civilian casualties. Although killing civilians in war is prohibited by the rules of war, including international humanitarian law, Geneva Convention and other international treaties. However, civil casualties are almost always present. Notwithstanding, in some cases killing of civilians may be justified, that’s what the Doctrine of Double Effect is about.

 The principle of Double Effect is frequently referred in order to explain permissibility of serious harm or death of a human being as a side effect of fulfilling war objectives. According to the principle of double effect, sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a side effect (or “double effect”) of bringing about a good result even though it would       not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about the same good end.[1]

First author who introduces the principle of double effect was Toma Aquinas in his discussion of the permissibility of self-defense.[2] Medieval catholic political thought in The New Catholic Encyclopedia envisages four prerequisites for the application of the principle of double effect:

  • 1.    The act itself must be morally good or at least indifferent;
  • 2.    The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may permit it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect he should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary;
  • 3.    The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in the order of causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) as the bad effect. In other words the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect. Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed;
  • 4.    The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the allowing of the bad effect.[3]

Finally, there is a fifth requirement for the principle of double doctrine, and that is that agents strive to minimize the foreseen harm.[4] “Michael Walzer has convincingly argued that agents who cause harm as a foreseen side effect of promoting a good end must be willing to accept additional risk or to forego some benefit in order to minimize how much harm they cause.”[5]

When it comes to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, it was under the pretext of human rights violations and preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. Thirteen NATO member states have attacked Yugoslavia in March by bombing which lasted until June in an operation called “Allied Force”.[6] During the arial bombardment several civilian objects were shot, including civilian maternity hospital in Belgrade, civilian train, civilian convoy, TV station and market place. NATO officials marked more than 500 civilian casualties as a “collateral damage”. “Collateral damage” is the term used to mark civil casualties which arises from the Doctrine of Double Effect.

This text will analyze three different cases of military actions in FR Yugoslavia. The first one is the bombardment of maternity hospital in Belgrade. On 20th May 1999. Around 5 AM, NATO aviation has bombed maternity hospital Dr. Dragiša Mišović, killing 3 patients and 1 worker, numerous injured. “Two women in the process of giving birth and one new born baby are reported wounded”.[7] According to the official NATO statement, target of the bombing was not the hospital but military barracks nearby. “NATO confirmed that one of eight laser-guided bombs intended for a military barracks in the predawn attack overshot its target by 500 yards”.[8] There are several military objects in Dedinje, part of Belgrade where the hospital was, including Military Academy and several barracks. However, these objects did not have anti-aircraft weapons nor any weapon which would endanger NATO. Therefore, if we apply the principle of proportionality on this case, the results are as follows. Zero killed soldiers, zero military objects destroyed, 4 civilians killed and 1 civilian object hit. Even if military barrack were hit together with hospital, it would be questionable whether the principle of proportionality was fulfilled. Hospital clearly was not a military target, and though NATO has not hit any military target nor gain any military advantage by this bombing, it cannot be justified under the Doctrine of Double Effect.

Picture: Destroyed wing of the maternity hospital in Belgrade

Picture: Destroyed wing of Dragiša Mišović' hospital

Second case which is going to be analyzed is the bombing of the civilian train on the bridge in Grdelica gorge, southern Serbia, on 12th April 1999. During April, the focus of NATO campaign has shifted from military objects to strategic and economic targets, especially bridges.  On a daylight, at 11:40 AM, a civilian train has been hit with two missiles on the bridge over the South Morava river, in attack in which 10 civilians were found dead and 16 injured.[9] The question is why NATO decided to bomb the bridge while the civilian train was on it? Did they know that there would be the train and that it was a civilian one? According to NATO reports, the train was standing on the bridge when it was hit. However, on the footage available on YouTube[10], it can be seen that the train was hit as it was moving. 



NATO acknowledged it had targeted a “rail bridge it considered an important military supply line and said there were reports that a train was on or near the bridge at the time of the attack”.[11] So, now the question is, if NATO knew there is a (civilian) train on the bridge, or approaching it, why they decided to bomb it at that very moment? Even if this bridge was used as an important line for military supply and was considered as a legitimate military target, bombardment of the bridge at the moment when civilian train is approaching it did not consider a concern for the lives of civilians. If command decided to bomb the bride just few minutes earlier or later, this is not a very busy bridge, it is not like there are trains going over it every minute, they would have fulfilled military objective without killing the civilians. Taken into account everything said by now, it cannot be said that killing these civilians was indispensable and impossible to avoid in order to gain military advantage. Therefore, one can conclude that neither in this case the Doctrine of Double Effect cannot be justified. However, one think can be added here, and that is that Yugoslav military has used civilian trains to transport military personnel to the Kosovo province prior to the bombing campaign. If NATO had serious doubt or reasonable suspicion that military personnel, weapons or supply were on that train, killing 10 and wounding 16 civilians could have been justified under the Double Effect Doctrine. However, NATO never stated, in regards to this attack, that they had a suspicion that the train was used for any military purpose, and it wasn’t.

Picture: Grdelica bridgePicture: Grdelica Bridge

Finally, third case that will be observed in this paper is the bombing of the national TV station – Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) on April 23, 1999. At the moment of attack around 150 people was in the building, 10 were killed and 18 injured as a consequence of bombing.[12] Two main reasons were used for bombing the TV station, first, the Radio Television of Serbia station’s operations had a military component and the goal was to cut off the communication. Second, it was responsible for broadcasting pro-Serb propaganda which was guilty of prolonging the war, according to the UK’s Ministry of Defense, Clare Short.[13] When it comes to the first reason, cutting off the communications, because TV towers were used by military, principle of Double Effect Doctrine might be applicable, however, stopping propaganda is not sufficient reason to kill 10 civilians and risk killing 150. Nevertheless, if we take into account the first reason (cutting off the communication used in military purpose) was the main reason behind the bombing, and by this stopping the enemy in inflicting casualties, in that case the Double Effect Doctrine may be applicable.


Picture: The Building of RTS in Flames 

We have seen three examples in which civil casualties occurred as a result of military actions. Only one of them can be justified under the Doctrine of Double Effect. However, we are witnessing a lot of “collateral casualties” in modern warfare. Usually, very small number of them can be justified. War is per se hideous thing, and civilians deserve a better protection. In general, humanitarian interventions are often disputed, and NATO aggression on FR Yugoslavia was a mix of reasons among which one was geopolitical goals. One should have in mind when it commes to 1999. conflict. 



[1] Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Doctrine of Double Effect, 2004, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ , retrieved: 24.10.2020.

[2] Tomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II, p. 226-227

[3] Connell, F.J., 1967. “Double Effect, Principle of,” New Catholic Encyclopedia (Volume 4), New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 1020–2,

[4] Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Doctrine of Double Effect, 2004, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/ , retrieved: 26.10.2020.

[5] Ibid

[6] NATO Press Conference, 25. March 1999, https://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm, retrieved 26.10.2020.

[7] Human Rights Watch, Incidents Involving Civilian Deaths in Operation Allied Force, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-02.htm, retrieved: 01.11.2020.

[8] Washington Post, NATO Bomb Said to Hit Belgrade Hospital, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/brussels052199.htm, 20.05.1999, retrieved: 01.11.2020. 

[9] CNN, Yugoslav train hit during NATO strike, 10 dead, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/12/nato.attack.07/, retrieved: 16.11.2020.

[10] YouTube, NATO Bombing on Grdelica Bridge – first strike, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIi2QDJYLwk, retrieved: 16.11.2020.

[11] CNN, Yugoslav train hit during NATO strike, 10 dead, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/12/nato.attack.07/, retrieved: 16.11.2020.

[12] NATO, Press Release S-1(99)62

[13] The Guardian, Serb TV station was legitimate target, says Blair, https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/apr/24/balkans3, retrieved: 20.11.2020.

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